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1 Abstract
We propose a framework for threshold cryptosystems under a permissionless-
economic model in which the participants are rational profit-maximizing enti-
ties. To date, threshold cryptosystems have been considered under permissioned
settings with a limited adversary. Our framework relies on an escrow service
that slashes and redistributes deposits to incentivize participants to adhere de-
sired behaviors. Today, more than ever, sophisticated escrow services can be
implemented over public blockchains like Ethereum, without additional trust
assumptions. The key threat to rational threshold cryptosystems is collusion—
by cooperating “illegally”, a subset of participants can reveal the cryptosystem’s
secret, which, in turn is translated to unfair profit. Our countermeasure to col-
lusion is framing. If the escrow is notified of collusion, it rewards the framer and
slashes the deposits of all other participants. We show that colluding parties find
themselves in the prisoner’s dilemma, where the dominant strategy is framing.
2 Introduction
In threshold cryptosystems several parties cooperate in order to produce a signa-
ture, decrypt a ciphertext, or reveal a secret. In particular, in a (t, n)-threshold
cryptosystem there are n participants, any t + 1 of which need to cooperate in
order to use the system. Any smaller subset is doomed to fail.
The motivation for our work stems from the key insight that threshold cryp-
tosystems have an inherent conflict—on the one hand they require the coopera-
tion of their participants in order to function, while on the other hand, in certain
circumstances, cooperation completely undermines the functionality of the sys-
tem and is undesired. To our knowledge, this difficulty has not been explicitly
formulated and a proper solution has not been proposed.
A simple example is found in (t, n) publicly verifiable secret sharing [31],
where t + 1 players can co-decrypt a player’s commitment. The players are in-
structed to co-decrypt only after all players have shared their commitments, and
not beforehand. Otherwise, the output of the protocol can be easily manipulated
([25] use randomness beacons in this spirit).
Consider another picturesque example. Satoshi Nakamoto wishes to reveal
her identity, but only after she dies. She is willing to pay R bitcoins to achieve
her goal. She anonymously contacts n known figures in the Bitcoin community
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and offers them a deal—she would share with them, via Shamir Secret Sharing,
a signed Bitcoin transaction transferring each of them R/n bitcoins, from an
address known to belong to Satoshi. The secret would include her real-world
identity, such that the cooperation of t+ 1 of them would both reveal her iden-
tity and allow each participant to realize her R/n reward. Of course, from the
participants’ perspective, there is no reason to trust this anonymous character,
let alone believe she is Satoshi. All the same, the promised R/n bitcoins should
incentivize them to participate1. The problem is that while Satoshi only wants
to reveal her secret after she dies, the participants have clear motivation to co-
operate before that time and gain an immediate reward (and finally find out
who Satoshi is).
Traditional threshold cryptosystems assume that the participants follow the
protocol blindly, unless they have been corrupted by the adversary, which then
controls their behavior. The adversary is limited and can corrupt up to t < n/2
participants2. This model immediately circumvents the key difficulty mentioned
above—when cooperation is not allowed by the protocol, non-corrupted partici-
pants will simply refuse to cooperate. Evidently though, an adversary controlling
t participants is unlikely to stop there as she is highly motivated to corrupt the
t+ 1 participant and get control of the underlying cryptosystem.
To tackle the problem we must first define formally what can be gained and
what are the stakes in the system. We therefore start by considering an economic
layer atop the cryptosystem. We abandon the assumption that participants can
be trusted, and assume instead that they are rational entities seeking to max-
imize their own profit within this economic environment. To be able to shape
their behavior we rely on an escrow service that takes deposits and follows a
specific set of rules. Such an escrow can be realized, for example, as a smart
contract over Ethereum [7].
The idea of enhancing a cryptosystem using an escrow service was suggested
by Randao [28]—a multi-party coin tossing protocol for generating randomness.
There, if a participant fails to submit her valid secret, her deposit is slashed.
There are three main caveats to this approach. First, the price of failing the
protocol is low—failing amounts to convincing a single participant to refuse
to submit her secret. Second, it remains cryptic as to what is the incentive of
participants to join the service in the first place. Implicitly, one can assume
there is some intrinsic value tied to the system, but this is not articulated and
Randao does not provide an analysis tying this value to the required deposits.
Finally, in its current implementation, Randao invokes too much interaction with
Ethereum, and cannot scale well with the number of participants3.
1 Proving that the transaction indeed encompasses the promised bitcoins, without
revealing its input UtxOs, can be done in zero-knowledge.
2 The restriction t < n/2 guarantees honest majority, which implies that there are
t + 1 honest participants that would advance the protocol. When robustness is not
of concern, this restriction can be relaxed.
3 This could be improved using off-chain communication and interactive dispute pro-
tocols in the spirit of App. C.
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A rational threshold cryptosystem that has been widely studied is rational
secret sharing [20,19,2,26,15]. There however, only a specific aspect of the prob-
lem is dealt with, namely that participants prefer to learn the secret alone. The
objective of the protocol is to guarantee that all participants learn of the secret
together. In particular, cooperation at unintended times is not an option under
their model and is not considered.
Our framework handles both problems—cooperating “illegally”, which we
refer to as collusion; and the ability to assure legitimate cooperation when it is
required, which we refer to as robustness. For a given threshold cryptosystem,
our framework allows to assess the economic constraints on collusion (Sec. 5.2)
and the price to interrupt with the robustness of the protocol (Sec. 5.3). It
thus allows system designers to build systems with adequate economic collusion
resistance and economic robustness, as we show in Sec. 5. It also provides tools
for users to assess the trustworthiness of the system.
We demonstrate the usefulness of our framework with two examples. In the
first, unique threshold signatures are used to realize a randomness beacon (as
done in [22,28] for example), which is then used for a simple lottery game. We
also elaborate on Satoshi’s example, previously mentioned.
3 Background—Threshold Cryptography
Shamir’s secret sharing (SSS) [30] is an algorithm that realizes a threshold cryp-
tosystem in which t+1 participants need to cooperate in order to reveal a secret.
The procedure is simple. The owner of a secret x randomly generates a degree t
polynomial f , where f(0) = x. She then numerates the participants P1, . . . , Pn
and shares with Pi the value f(i), which is referred to as Pi’s secret key share.
Now, any t + 1 participants can reconstruct the secret f(0) by using Lagrange
interpolation. No smaller set of participants can deduce any information on f(0)
whatsoever.
Threshold cryptosystems for signatures or encryption consist of two stages:
1. A key generation procedure, executed once to set up the system by generating
the necessary keys—participants end up with secret key shares, that together
correspond to some global secret key x; x is kept secret from all participants,
but X , its corresponding public key, is known to all.
2. An application stage, where the key shares may be used jointly over and
over in order to sign messages or co-decrypt ciphertexts.
Since the key shares must be related to one another, key generation must be
coordinated and cannot be done independently by each participant. In the ab-
sence of a trusted coordinator, Distributed Key Generation (DKG) protocols
allow a set of n participants to jointly distribute key shares, without leaking any
information on the secret x, and while maintaining the desired threshold t.
Our work relies on a well-known family of DKG protocols for discrete-log
based threshold cryptosystems [14,27,18,17] that rely on SSS. Feldman [14]
showed how SSS can be made verifiable, by having the protocol produce public
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data allowing the participants to check the validity of their private key shares.
Feldman’s verifiable secret sharing (VSS) relies on a trusted dealer to generate
the global secret. Pedersen [27] was first to eliminate the need for a trusted dealer
by parallelizing n Feldman’s VSS runs, each led by a participant Pi committing
(publicly) to her local polynomial fi. Then, the global polynomial f is defined to
be the sum of the local polynomials, and the global secret is f(0). This protocol
is known as Ped-DKG. In App. A we give an overview of this protocol.
In [18,17], Gennaro et al. formulate a minimal set of requirements for a (t, n)-
DKG protocol in discrete-log based cryptosystems over a group G = 〈g〉 of prime
order q:
Correctness.
(C1) There is an efficient procedure that on an input consisting of any t+1 distinct
(and correct) secret key shares produced by the protocol outputs the same
secret x. There is another efficient procedure4 that on an input consisting
of n different secret key shares (of which at least t+ 1 are correct) and the
public data produced by the protocol, outputs the secret x.
(C2) There is an efficient procedure to calculate gx from the public data produced
by the protocol, where x is the unique secret key guaranteed by (C1).
(C3) x is uniformly distributed in Zq, hence g
x is uniformly distributed in G.
Secrecy. No information on x can be learned by the adversary except for what
is implied by the value gx. More formally, secrecy depends on the existence of
a distribution, parameterized by gx alone, which generates data that is indis-
tinguishable from the public data produced by the protocol (in the eyes of the
adversary, which is assumed to know t secret key shares).
4 Rational Threshold Cryptosystems
In this section we set the ground for threshold cryptosystems that guarantee cor-
rectness, secrecy, and robustness in rational environments. We propose a frame-
work that encompasses the entire lifetime of the cryptosystem—from key gener-
ation to application. The key generation kick-starts the system by distributing
correct keys to the participants. These are later used within some desired appli-
cation, in which secrecy and robustness are to be maintained.
4.1 Model
In our model a set of n rational participants P1, . . . , Pn take part in the cryptosys-
tem. We cannot expect them to follow some predetermined set of instructions,
and assume instead that they are driven to maximize their utility. We make
4 This procedure alludes to some efficient way to verify the validity of a single share.
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a distinction between participants and entities—different entities have indepen-
dent utilities, but different participants may correspond to the same entity5. The
utility of an entity is her total profit (or loss) by the end of the system’s lifetime.
We assume the existence of a transparent escrow service that takes partici-
pants’ deposits and can burn deposits, or redistribute them, according to pre-
determined rules. External entities, i.e., ones that do not have a participant in
the cryptosystem (we refer to them as the public), are exposed to the cryptosys-
tem via the transparent escrow service. Entities communicate with the escrow
via (signed) transactions. The escrow is assumed to be publicly available with
a known bound on transactions’ processing time. Such an escrow can be im-
plemented as a smart contract over Ethereum6. Moreover, we assume a public
broadcast channel and a complete network of private channels between the par-
ticipants (as required by Ped-DKG). Finally, we do not force any constraints on
the ratio between t and n—different ratios reflect different trade-offs.
Economic adversarial model. To formulate our economic model we assume
that a threshold cryptosystem holds some total value R. During its lifetime, αR
of that value, for some 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, is intended to reward the participants. The
reward however, is conditioned on the cooperation of the participants under
application-specific limitations. In expectancy, each participant gets αR
n
. The
remaining, (1 − α)R goes to the external entities. If t + 1 participants manage
to cooperate “illegally” while ignoring the limitations, they can enjoy a larger
portion of the reward R7. We refer to such cooperation as collusion. The main
goal of our framework is to prevent the option of profitable collusion.
Example I. In a simple lottery game the winning ticket is determined accord-
ing to a random value in the form of a unique threshold signature over some
nothing-up-my-sleeve (publicly known) value. The total money raised selling
lottery tickets is R, where (1 − α)R is the total prize and αR is paid to the
participants generating the signature. The lottery must guarantee that no entity
5 One approach to model permissioned participation is by assuming that participants
correspond to different entities. Our model is permissionless in this sense.
6 Ethereum, however, has very limited throughput and the cost for on-chain transac-
tions is high. While many techniques minimize the on-chain component of the system
and carry all of the heavy lifting off-chain (e.g., TrueBit [32], and Arbitrum [24]),
in this section we focus on the economic perspective of our system, and ignore lim-
itations imposed by Ethereum. In a sense, we assume “an ideal Ethereum” whose
capacity and utilization costs resemble that of a modern computer. In App. C we
show how to adjust our framework to comply with Ethereum in its current state.
7 This model suits the economic setting in Bitcoin—R is 21 million bitcoins, α = 1, t =
n
2
, and one participant can be thought of as one hash rate unit. Selfish mining [13,29]
is interpreted as “illegal” collusion, where 51% of the hash rate results in 100% of
the rewards. Of course, the total hash rate in Bitcoin is ever changing and miners
join and leave the network as they please, which means maintaining 51% of the hash
rate can be difficult.
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becomes aware of the winning ticket whilst the ticket sale is taking place8. Thus,
the application-specific limitation is that the signature is produced only after
the ticket sale closes.
Example II. In Satoshi’s example, R is the total amount of bitcoins paid by
Satoshi, and α = 1. Collusion translates to immediate profit rather than having
to wait until Satoshi passes away.
4.2 Design rationale
Our economic model strongly captures the inherent collusion pressure in thresh-
old cryptosystems. The main goal of the framework we propose is to dismantle
this pressure by aligning the participants’ utility-maximizing strategies with the
application-specific limitations. The system designer’s only tool in shaping the
behavior of the participants is the escrow service, which (unlike the participants)
follows prescribed rules in the protocol without deviations.
Our first design choice is to condition participation on a deposit made to the
escrow. Fundamentally, we interpret a threshold cryptosystem as an investment
channel in which entities invest an initial sum of money (the deposit), and hope
for a return (the reward, αR
n
)9. As in any investment channel though, a risk
aspect is inevitable10. Indeed, the escrow can decide to slash deposits in case
complaints are filed.
Complaints are the mechanism by which the escrow guides the participants’
behavior in practice. The escrow supports a set of complaints that should deter
participants from deviating from their intended behavior. The complaint mech-
anism is composed of four elements:
1. Detection. A participant detects unintended behavior by another participant.
2. Proof. She provides the escrow with evidence of her findings.
3. Arbitration. The escrow verifies her proof.
4. Incentive layer. The escrow burns deposits and rewards participants accord-
ing to some predetermined specification.
A complaint mechanism is measured by its ability to support detection and
efficient arbitration of as many unintended behaviors as possible. Moreover, its
deterrence relies on complaining being profitable, which should be addressed by
the incentive layer.
Complaints may have additional consequences atop redistributing and burn-
ing deposits. In the original Ped-DKG protocol complaints result in revealing
8 For instance, if the escrow is a smart contract over Ethereum, the schedule of the
lottery would be determined by Ethereum block heights—certain block heights for
the ticket sale and later blocks for producing the signature.
9 In our Bitcoin analogy, this is equivalent to miners buying ASICs and paying elec-
tricity bills for a potential reward.
10 While in most investment channels the risk stems from market forces, here, there are
two types of risks: technical risks (e.g., software bugs or cyberattacks) and behavioral
risks, which depend on the choices the other participants make.
Rational Threshold Cryptosystems 7
secret sub-shares11 (or excluding participants from the set QUAL, see App. A),
but under the assumed adversarial model there, the DKG procedure never fails.
In contrast, our framework must allow the protocol to fail, for example when col-
lusion was detected. This introduces an attack vector against the system which
is to be mitigated by setting an appropriate cost to failing the system. We refer
to this cost as economic robustness.
4.3 Escrow-DKG and application
Escrow-DKG. Our DKG protocol, Escrow-DKG, kick-starts the cryptosystem.
Participants must first enroll by depositing funds to the escrow. The protocol
then proceeds in phases, roughly corresponding to those of Ped-DKG. All data
submitted to the escrow is publicly available to all participants. In Fig. 1 we
depict the complete description of the protocol.
As in Ped-DKG, when participants detect unintended behavior they may file
complaints. In Escrow-DKG, when a complaint is filed the protocol enters a dis-
pute phase between the prover (the entity filing the complaint and proving it)
and the challenger (the entity who challenges the complaint). For the escrow to
arbitrate the complaint, the prover submits all necessary data and the escrow
executes the necessary computations and rules whether the complaint is just (to
accommodate arbitration to Ethereum’s limitations, App. C illustrates an inter-
active arbitration protocol in which both sides, the prover and the challenger,
take active role). Then, the contract slashes and rewards accordingly. See Ta-
ble 1 for details. Once a complaint has been filed, the protocol fails. If desired,
the protocol can be easily relaunched. Specifically, we do not consider failing the
DKG as the end of the system’s lifetime. As we discuss in Sec. 5.3, we expect
failing the DKG to be very rare as there is no gain in doing so.
Application. If Escrow-DKG did not fail, we say it has completed successfully
and participants can begin using their key shares, e.g., in producing threshold
signatures. We emphasize the escrow keeps the deposits in order to incentivize
post-DKG behavior.
If required by the cryptosystem (as would often be), any public information
generated by Escrow-DKG can be submitted to the escrow. For example, one may
submit the public key, X0. Authenticity of public data submitted to the escrow
is subject to complaints (see cm5 in Table 1). However, after Escrow-DKG has
11 Revealing up to t of her sub-shares, a participant does not leak any information about
her local polynomial. This is of course theoretically true, but weakens the security
guarantees of the protocol. Imagine a situation where participant P1 has revealed t
of her sub-shares (due to t complaints against her). Without loss of generality, let
those be f1(2), . . . , f1(t + 1). Now, in order to reveal f1, it suffices to hack any of
the participants that did not complain, i.e., Pt+2, . . . , Pn. This is a much easier task
then having to specifically hack P1. We thus avoid instructing participants to reveal
their sub-shares.
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Fig. 1: Escrow-DKG
1 Enrollment. The relevant participants enroll to the protocol by submitting en-
rollment transactions to the escrow service. We refer to the participants by their
enrollment order 1 ≤ i ≤ n. To enroll, participant Pi locally generates:
(a) A random polynomial of degree t over Zq ,
fi(z) = ai,0 + ai,1z + · · ·+ ai,tz
t
(b) A private key ξi ∈ Zq for private communication.
(c) Public commitments to fi’s coefficients, Xi,k = g
ai,k for k ∈ {0, . . . , t}.
She then submits her enrollment transaction,
tx1(i) =
[
∆, γξi , H(Xi,0)
]
where, ∆ is her deposit, γξi is her public encryption key and H(Xi,0) is her hash
commitment to her partial secret ai,0.
2 Public commitments. Every participant Pi publishes commitments transaction,
tx2(i) =
[
{Xi,k}
t
k=0
]
If Pi fails to publish tx2(i) in time, any participant j can file a complaint,
cm1(j, i), against Pi. If Xi,0 given in tx2(i) does not match its hash commit-
ment from tx1(i), or otherwise some commitment fails the group membership
testa, any participant j can file a complaint cm2(j, i).
3 Sub-shares. Every participant Pi locally computes her sub-shares xi,j = fi(j) for
all j. For j 6= i she encrypts xi,j using Pj ’s public encryption key and publishes
the corresponding sub-share transactions,
tx3(i, j) =
[
ENCγξi
(
xi,j
)]
If Pi fails to publish tx3(i, j) in time, any participant l can file a complaint,
cm3(l, i, j) against her.
4 Sub-shares verification. Every participant Pi locally verifies that the sub-shares
intended to her are consistent with the public commitments. That is, she checks
that for all j,
gxj,i =
t∏
k=0
(
Xj,k
)ik
If the equality for some j does not hold, Pi can file a sub-share complaint,
cm4(i, j, ξi) against Pj .
5 Conclusion. If no complaints were filed during the course of the protocol, Escrow-
DKG is said to have completed successfully. Each Pi can compute her key share
xi =
∑n
j=1 xj,i, as well as the global public key X0 =
∏n
i=1Xi,0. She also
computes the public key share gxj for all participants Pj . Deposits are kept for
the application stage.
If some complaint is filed, it is arbitrated by the escrow, and the protocol can be
relaunched with the same set of participants, excluding the one slashed by the
escrow.
a In [17,18] group membership of the public commitments (verifying thatXi,k ∈ 〈g〉)
was omitted, but seems necessary for the proofs. We therefore add this verification
check in Escrow-DKG.
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completed successfully, for robustness, complaints do not fail the cryptosystem
and might only invoke slashing of deposits12.
The main contribution of our framework is its ability to economically dis-
courage collusion, i.e., undesired cooperation of t+1 participants. We introduce
the option of framing in case collusion took place during the application stage.
At any point in time, any (bonded) entity may publish a framing complaint
containing evidence of collusion (framings are given in Table 1 as fm). Un-
like regular complaints, framing is not targeted against a specific participant
but rather against the entire system. We are compelled to do so as collusion
evidence cannot reveal any information regarding the (true) identities of the
colluding parties. For this reason, framing results in all deposits being burnt,
except for the reward given to the framer13 (see last row in Table 1). Framing
opens a new and lucrative opportunity for entities taking part in collusion. As
we show in the following section, when the system parameters are tuned cor-
rectly, entities are better off framing than colluding. Realizing this, entities are
discouraged to collude, fearing another entity would frame.
Example I. In our lottery example, collusion is manifested by the generation
of the signature that determines the winner during the ticket sale. The t + 1
colluding parties generating the signature can share the lottery prize by buying
the winning ticket. On the other hand, any entity within the collusion can frame
and enjoy a significant reward, while all other participants are slashed.
Example II. In Satoshi’s example, collusion is manifested by reconstructing the
secret while Satoshi is still alive. Participants should be discouraged from doing
so, fearing one of them would frame the others to enjoy an additional reward.
5 Properties
The protocol satisfies three properties that we discuss hereafter. Fundamentally,
we adapt the original requirements of a DKG protocol presented in Sec. 3 to our
economic model and prove them assuming that the entities are rational.
12 We note that the escrow service has no deterrence over a slashed participant, Pj .
To handle this, the corresponding secret key share, f(j), is revealed and from that
point on the system operates as a (t− 1, n− 1)-threshold cryptosystem. Pj ’s slashed
deposit can be used to incentivize participants to help reveal f(j).
13 We do not allow framing a specific participant by reveling her private data (e.g.,
f(j)), even though it would definitely serve as means to discourage data sharing
between entities. The problem is that it would also open the opportunity for anyone
controlling the cryptosystem (i.e., knowing f) to frame honest participants, increas-
ing the profits from collusion. As a matter of fact, “small collusions” (mining pools
in our Bitcoin analogy) are not necessarily bad if the different entities keep having
individual interests and are incentivized to frame in case the collusion became “big”.
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Table 1: Complaints and Framing
The table depicts the details of complaints, arbitration and the outcomes in
terms of slashing and rewarding. Notice that all complaints result in some value
being burnt: (n− t)∆ in justified framing and ∆/2 in all other cases.
Title Claim Arbitration procedure Incentives (justified /
unjustified)
cm1(j, i)
or
cm3(j, i, l)
Pi did not publish
tx1(i) or tx3(i, l). Trivial check.
Pi : −∆
Pm : +
∆
2(n−1)
∀m 6= i
Pj : −∆
Pm : +
∆
2(n−1)
∀m 6= j
cm2(j, i)
Pi published invalid
hash commitment.
Compute H(Xi,0) from
tx2(i) and compare it with
the value in tx1(i).
Pi : −∆
Pm : +
∆
2(n−1)
∀m 6= i
Pj : −∆
Pm : +
∆
2(n−1)
∀m 6= j
cm4(j, i, ξj)
Pi published an in-
consistent sub-share
xi,j .
Decrypt tx3(i, j) using ξj ,
and compute gxi,j . Com-
pare with
∏t
k=0(Xi,k)
jk us-
ing data from tx2(i).
Pi : −∆
Pj : +
∆
2
Pj : −∆
Pm : +
∆
2(n−1)
∀m 6= j
cm5(j, i)
Pi published in-
correct public data
txpub(i) (e.g., g
f(i)).
Use the commitments to
compute the desired value
(e.g.,
∏n
j=1 g
xj,i), and com-
pare with txpub(i).
Pi : −∆
Pm : +
∆
2(n−1)
∀m 6= i
Pj : −∆
Pm : +
∆
2(n−1)
∀m 6= j
fm(j, data)
data serves as col-
lusion evidence (e.g.,
data = f(0)).
Verify the evidence (e.g.,
check gdata =
∏n
i=1Xi,0).
Pj : +t∆
Pm : −∆ ∀m 6= j
Pj : −∆
Pm : +
∆
2(n−1)
∀m 6= j
5.1 Correctness
Claim (Correctness). If Escrow-DKG (i.e., only the DKG stage) completed suc-
cessfully, then the secret key shares and the public data produced by the protocol
admit (C1) and (C2).
The proof relies on the following lemma.
Lemma 1. During Escrow-DKG, if an entity has the possibility to file a justified
complaint, Escrow-DKG would not complete successfully.
Proof. We prove that if an entity has the chance to file a justified complaint
against another entity, she would do so. This might seem trivial as filing a justi-
fied complaint yields an immediate profit to the prover. However, in a pessimistic
Rational Threshold Cryptosystems 11
scenario, since complaints require relaunching the DKG, they might reduce the
value R—according to our model, the value R is attached to a specific cryptosys-
tem that is launched with a specific DKG run; relaunching implicitly means R
might change (e.g., in the lottery example, if the DKG fails, it might reduce the
system’s credibility and lead to a decrease in ticket sales). We show that even
under the worst case assumption that R reduces to zero after the complaint, it
is still beneficial for entities to complain when possible (even though it implies
they lose their own profit, αR
n
). There are three complaint categories to consider.
1. Private data mismatch (sub-share complaint cm4). A participant Pj has
clear motivation of having a secret key share that matches the public key.
If one of Pj ’s sub-shares fi(j) does not match Pi’s commitments, she would
end up with a useless key share that would not allow her to participate in
the protocol. De facto, Pj would not be a participant and would lose her
expected profit14, αR
n
. Thus, the immediate reward of ∆2(n−1) suffices for her
to complain.
2. Public data mismatch (cm2 and cm5). In this case any entity, including
external entities, can complain. Since external entities have nothing to lose
and will gain a profit from complaining, they will do so15. Participants know
someone would complain and are thus incentivized to do so themselves.
3. Missing data (cm1 and cm3). While we do mention these complaints, in
practice the escrow service itself can detect missing data. This serves enough
of an incentive to complain for the immediate profit. ⊓⊔
Proof (Correctness). From the previous lemma we can deduce that no entity
could have made a justified complaint during a successful run of Escrow-DKG.
Such a run is equivalent to a Ped-DKG run in which all the participants are
correct. The equivalence is given by mapping the participants in Escrow-DKG
to those in Ped-DKG, and assuming they sample the same local polynomials fi.
If all Ped-DKG participants are correct, then no one complains and the data
(public and private) produced by the protocol is identical to that in the Escrow-
DKG run. (C1) and (C2) in Ped-DKG imply (C1) and (C2) in Escrow-DKG. ⊓⊔
Handling (C3) is more tricky. Hashing gai,0 in the enrollment transaction
guarantees that when Pj samples her partial secret, aj,0, she is unaware of g
ai,0
(for any i) and cannot relate it to those of the other participants. Assuming one
participant sampled her partial secret uniformly in random is enough to conclude
that the sum is also distributed uniformly. However, the option of Escrow-DKG
to fail (i.e., not to complete successfully) opens the opportunity for participants
to try and manipulate gx. If a participant does not like the sampled gx, she
can fail Escrow-DKG and have it re-sampled in the subsequent run. We further
relate to this issue in Sec. 5.3.
14 We implicitly assume that the system rewards only active participants.
15 To prevent spam and unjust complaints, external complaints would be accompanied
by a deposit that would be slashed if they are found unjust.
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5.2 Collusion resistance
Obviously, a permissionless threshold cryptosystem has scenarios in which it
cannot be trusted, e.g., when a single entity controls t + 1 participants in the
DKG. While we cannot prevent such scenarios, our goal is to articulate concrete
economic conditions as to when a given cryptosystem is trustworthy and col-
lusion resistant. We say that a threshold cryptosystem is collusion resistant if
it adheres certain conditions which make collusion a non-profitable strategy16.
The following claim gives a strong condition in this spirit.
Claim (Collusion resistance). If R < (t−1)∆2 then “two-entity” collusion (i.e.,
collusion involving exactly two entities) can only take place between two entities
that invested at least (t+1)∆2 each.
The claim implies that one should trust the system to be collusion resis-
tant if they believe that there are no two entities controlling at least t+12 DKG
participants each17.
Proof. Consider the case of two separate entities A and B controlling a and b
DKG participants respectively. Assume a+ b ≥ t+ 1 so that if the two entities
collude they break the system. It is enough to show that for such collusion to be
profitable, A and B would each have to invest at least (t+1)∆2 .
We analyze the payoff matrix of A and B in case collusion took place (see
Table 2). Both entities have two options—to frame or not to frame.
Table 2: Framing Payoff Matrix
The case where both A and B do not frame (bottom-right) captures the pres-
sure to collude—instead of earning their fair share (A should earn a · αR
n
), the
total value held by the system, R, is now split solely between these two entities
(according to their weights). The other cases are self explanatory from the last
line in Table 1.
Entity A
Entity B
Frame Not frame
Frame Both have 0.5 probability of framing first
+(t− a)∆
−b∆
Not frame
−a∆
+(t− b)∆
+a · R/(t+ 1)
+b · R/(t+ 1)
16 In a collusion resistant cryptosystem, the secrecy property defined in Sec. 3 is satis-
fied. However, secrecy is not enough—collusion does not imply revealing x.
17 The trustworthiness question we raise here is fundamental also in Bitcoin. One should
trust Bitcoin only if they believe no single entity is controlling more than 50% of the
hash power. The open nature of Bitcoin and the ability of anyone to start mining
makes this assumption reasonable.
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In case B chose to frame, A is obviously better off framing as well (whoever
gets her complaint processed first profits while the other gets slashed). Otherwise,
in case B does not frame, A’s utility can either be (t − a)∆ (by framing), or
Ra
a+b ≤
Ra
t+1 (by not framing)
18. In case a < t+12 , A is better off framing (for this
we only need R < (t− 1)∆). B’s view is symmetric, which means only if a and
b both are at least t+12 no framing would occur.
We are not done yet. If a < t+12 then B would disagree to collude with A—B
knows A’s dominant strategy is to frame. For A to convince B she will not frame,
her payoff matrix must change—either her profit from framing reduces or her
profit from a successful collusion increases.
In the first case, A would have to convince B of an additional loss, ∆A, in
case she (or anyone else for that matter) framed19. Her total investment would
then be a∆+∆A and in order to be discouraged from framing, this needs to be
larger than t∆− Ra
t+1 . Simple arithmetics shows that A’s investment would have
to be larger than (3t−1)∆4 (after substituting R with
(t−1)∆
2 )
20.
Since A’s investment is higher than (t+1)∆2 , we conclude that in this scenario
collusion is profitable only if both sides invest more than (t+1)∆2 . To complete
the proof we have to analyze B’s option to offer A additional profits should
the collusion succeed. B could only offer her marginal profit from the collusion
(relative to not colluding), which is Rb
t+1 −
αRb
n
. This sum, combined with A’s
profit from a successful collusion, Ra
t+1 , would have to be larger than A’s minimal
profit from framing, (t− t+12 )∆ (where the
(t+1)∆
2 subtracted is derived from the
fact that, in the setting suggested by the claim, A is not willing to invest more
than (t+1)∆2 ). Our assumption on R does not allow this even if α = 0. ⊓⊔
Interestingly, collusion resistance does not depend on the parameter α or on
the ratio t/n—only the ratio between R and ∆ matters. In practice though, the
reward, αR
n
, needs to be attractive for participants to join.
Corollary 1. In the setting of claim 5.2, if no entity has invested at least (t+1)∆2
then collusion cannot take place.
Proof. If no entity has invested (t+1)∆2 then no two entities could be found to
collude and obtain t + 1 secret key shares. If entities that invested less than
(t+1)∆
2 were to collude, forming a “multiple-entity” collusion, any entity within
that collusion could view the payoff matrix as herself against the other entities,
united. It would thus be profitable for any entity within that collusion to frame.
We can thus conclude that no collusion would emerge. ⊓⊔
18 Not surprisingly, the more participants an entity controls the less she is encouraged
to frame.
19 One way to guarantee such loss would be to deposit ∆A in a side contract which is
instructed to burn the deposit in case framing took place.
20 We note a simple trade-off—the lower R’s bound is (in terms of ∆), the larger ∆A
becomes. In essence this means that locking funds in side contracts is less lucrative,
as more funds need to be invested in order to convince B that framing is unprofitable.
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5.3 Robustness
If collusion resistance mitigates the risk of entities breaking the cryptosystem,
robustness deals with the possibility of failing it. Economic robustness estimates
the price of the different ways to fail the system—failing Escrow-DKG (by tak-
ing advantage of the complaint mechanism); failing the system during the ap-
plication stage (by taking advantage of the framing mechanism); or putting the
system to a halt (by convincing enough participants not to cooperate).
Failing Escrow-DKG can be done by complaining unjustly or by submitting
inconsistent data. We set the price of failing Escrow-DKG to be ∆/2 (see Ta-
ble 1), which is not high (but sufficient to prevent spam). This choice is sensible
as not much can be gained from failing the DKG. Manipulating the secret x is
not possible, and while last actor attacks allow manipulating gx, it was shown
in [17] that the influence on gx is very limited. In our setting this influence comes
with a price, as each attempt to re-sample gx costs ∆/2.
During the application stage, framing can be used to fail the cryptosystem.
The price of convincing t+ 1 participants to collude and then frame themselves
must be higher than what they get in the first place which is (t+1)αR
n
(addition-
ally, they should be compensated for the burnt ∆ due to the framing). Setting
this price high amounts to tuning the ratio t/n and the value α to be rather
high.
Finally, refusing to cooperate also amounts to failing the protocol. Lack of
cooperation implies n− t participants refuse to reveal their share. By instructing
the escrow to burn all deposits in case of such lack of cooperation, we set the
price of failing at (n− t)∆21. For this price to be high, one should set n − t to
be rather high.
It only makes sense to tune the parameters such that failing the protocol
either way costs the same (excluding the DKG stage). This condition yields a
relation between α and t/n. A simple computation gives α ∼ 2n(n−t)
t2
. Intuitively,
the smaller α is, the higher t/n needs to be. To get α = 0.25, we need t/n = 0.9
which sets the price of failing the application at n10∆. Note the linear dependence
in n.
Example I. Let’s try some numbers in our lottery example. For R = 106, ∆ =
104 and α = 0.25, the prize is 750, 000 and 250, 000 is the reward paid to the
participants generating the randomness for their services. For a 10% ROI (which
is lucrative for, say, a month’s long investment), n would have to be 250 and
t = 0.9 · n = 225 (note that indeed R is slightly smaller than (t−1)∆2 ). Collusion
is irrational as long as no entity has 113 participants, which translates to a
1, 130, 000 investment. Failing the protocol after the DKG would cost 25∆ =
250, 000.
21 Note that even though participants expect a reward of αR
n
from participating in the
cryptosystem, we make a worst case assumption where only one participant gets the
whole αR (thus the αR
n
factor is ignored in the pricing calculation).
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Example II. Satoshi would deploy a smart contract22 including the hash of her
secret, and a trapdoor that allows (only) her to invoke slashing deposits. The
trapdoor would expire within a year, but could be extended for another year, if
Satoshi is still alive (and submits a transaction). We note that in this example,
the analysis made above needs some modifications. First, it is known that the
secret share holders are distinct real-world entities (the permissioned setting),
and second, even in case of framing, the R/n reward is guaranteed (Satoshi’s
signed transaction will not change). Framing can only yield an additional profit
to the framers. This somewhat changes the payoff matrix in Table 2. In these
circumstances, a less lucrative reward from framing is a better option. That is,
framing would reward the framer with t∆2 (instead of t∆). This would reduce
the risk of t+1 participants deciding to split the costs of the slashing for the im-
mediate reward R/n and would enable reducing the size of the deposits (instead
of ∆/(t+ 1) > R/n, we would need ∆/2 > R/n).
Once Satoshi dies, she stops extending the trapdoor and the participants
can safely cooperate and reveal the secret, as framing could no longer invoke
slashing23. To eliminate the risk of side contracts (mentioned in Sec. 5.2), the
deposits would have to be high enough, so that t∆2 is too high an amount for
the participants to put aside.
Example III. In App. D we propose a multi-round leader election protocol
that relies on an escrow service (which could be used to realize a sidechain
to Ethereum) that mimics and improves on Bitcoin’s incentive structure.
6 Conclusion and Future Work
In this work we defined an economic model for rational threshold cryptosystems,
which captures both the economic value produced by such systems, as well as
the rationality of those taking part in the system, acting to maximize their
own profits. We solve the problem of collusion pressure inherent to rational
cryptosystems by utilizing an escrow service that takes deposits from participants
and uses them to discourage participants from colluding. We show how such an
escrow can be realized over Ethereum.
Our framework illustrates how threshold cryptosystems might be applicable
in decentralized-permissionless settings, whereas the classic model for threshold
cryptography is only applicable in trusted environments. The Satoshi example
showed that our framework is suitable also in the permissioned setting, where
each participant represents a distinct entity.
Our main contribution is to attach concrete economic costs to breaking the
secrecy and robustness of the cryptosystem. The fact that these costs are func-
tions of the system’s parameters (t, n,R, α) achieves two goals. First, it allows
22 Ironically, Bitcoin is not a viable option to this end...
23 To eliminate Satoshi’s option of handing the trapdoor extension key to a friend
before she dies, a hard limit should be added.
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system designers to tune these parameters to suit their needs, and second, per-
haps more importantly, it enables users to assess the credibility of the system. As
a motivating example, we consider a set of n participants that “Shamir share” a
secret. While the participants have the ability to cooperate and reveal the secret
at any time, our framework economically assures that they do so only in specific
times defined by the system designers.
Our framework raises many questions. We are especially interested in the fol-
lowing issues, which we leave for future work. First and foremost, in the permis-
sionless setting, collusion resistance and robustness rely on the ability to support
very large n and t and to have an open and unlimited enrollment procedure (sim-
ilarly to Bitcoin hash rate). Due to the computational (group arithmetics) and
communication complexity of Ped-DKG, it can only support a limited number of
participants. Future work is required to scale the number of participants—e.g.,
by having several DKG groups run side by side, as proposed in [22], or use the
sparse matrix approach suggested in [10].
Another interesting question is how to increase the robustness of the cryp-
tosystem, especially during the DKG. The low cost of failing Escrow-DKG is a
weak spot in our framework which could be critical in some applications. A more
permissive complaint mechanism in the spirit of Ped-DKG (where complaints
do not necessarily fail the DKG procedure), enhanced with slashing unjustified
complaints, might be a good direction.
In the context of robustness, even if enough participants have principally
decided to cooperate during the application stage (e.g., generate a threshold
signature), the exact communication scheme between them is not considered in
this work. In rational secret sharing [20], communication protocols are considered
with the aim that all the participants reveal the secret together. Achieving this
would enhance the robustness of the cryptosystem, and its fairness.
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7 Appendix
Appendix A Ped-DKG and Feldman’s VSS
The full description of Ped-DKG is given below (Fig. 2). The correctness and
secrecy properties of Ped-DKG rely on a generalization of similar properties in
Feldman’s VSS [14] (in which a single participant samples a polynomial and
distributes commitments and shares, and the other participants only perform
the validations).
Lemma 2 (Feldman). Feldman’s VSS satisfies the following properties:
1. If the dealer Pi is not disqualified during the protocol then all correct players
hold shares that interpolate to a unique polynomial fi of degree t. In par-
ticular, any t + 1 of these shares suffice to efficiently reconstruct the secret
fi(0).
2. The protocol produces information (the public values Xi,k for k = 0, . . . , t and
private values xi,j for j = 1, . . . , n) that can be used at reconstruction time
to test for the correctness of each share; thus, reconstruction is possible, even
in the presence of malicious players, from any subset of shares containing at
least t+ 1 correct shares.
3. The view of the adversary is independent of the secret fi(0), and therefore
secrecy is unconditional.
While the generalization to the Ped-DKG protocol seems straightforward,
the attack described in [18] shows there are delicate issues to address.
Appendix B Threshold BLS-3 Signatures
Throughout the paper we describe a randomness beacon based on threshold
BLS-3 signatures. For completeness, we specify the ingredients of the proposed
signature scheme.
BLS Signatures. In [4] the authors present a signature scheme based on the
Weil pairing, which is both simple and efficient. It results in signatures which
are unique, namely, for a pair of message and public key (m,PK) there exists
a unique signature M which passes validation. The scheme relies on the Diffie-
Hellman problem and its variants. Let G = 〈g〉 be a cyclic group of order q. We
consider the following problems:
Decision Diffie-Hellman (DDH). Let a, b, c ∈ Zq. Given a tuple (g, g
a, gb, gc),
decide whether gc = gab.
Computational Diffie-Hellman (Co-DHP). Let a, b ∈ Zq. Given a tuple
(g, ga, gb), compute gab.
A DDH (resp. Co-DHP) group is a group in which the DDH (resp. Co-DHP)
is hard. A Gap Diffie-Hellman (GDH) group is one where the DDH is easy while
the Co-DHP is hard.
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Fig. 2: Ped-DKG
1. Each player Pi samples uniformly at random (and independently) t+1 coef-
ficients from Zq . These coefficients represent a random polynomial of degree
t over Zq , denoted fi:
fi(z) = ai,0 + ai,1z + · · ·+ ai,tz
t
Pi broadcasts her public commitments Xi,k = g
ai,k for k = 0, . . . , t. Pi com-
putes the sub-shares xi,j = fi(j) for j = 1, . . . , n and privately sends xi,j to
player Pj .
2. Each player Pj verifies the sub-shares she received from the other players by
checking
gxi,j =
t∏
k=0
(
Xi,k
)jk
for i = 1, . . . , n.
If a check fails for some index i, Pj broadcasts a complaint against Pi.
3. In the case of a complaint against Pi by Pj , Pi reveals the sub-share xi,j
(via the public broadcast communication channel). If any of the revealed
sub-shares fail the above equation, Pi is excluded from the set QUAL (i.e.,
disqualified). If more than t players complain against Pi, she is also disquali-
fied (as t+ 1 sub-shares reveal fi by interpolation). From the assumption on
the broadcast channel, the set QUAL is defined uniquely among the correct
participants.
4. The global secret x itself cannot be computed by any player, but is equal
to x =
∑
i∈QUAL ai,0 = f(0). The public key g
x can be calculated by any
participant as
∏
i∈QUALXi,0 = g
f(0).
Additionally, the secret key share of player Pj is xj = f(j) =
∑
i∈QUAL xi,j ,
which only Pj can compute. The corresponding public key g
xj however, can
be calculated from the public commitments published in (1) (using Lagrange
interpolation).
BLS utilizes GDH groups to design a signature scheme in which signing and
verifying signatures is efficient: let G = 〈g〉 be a GDH group, and x ∈ Zq be the
secret key, assumed to be known to the signer alone. Define X = gx to be the
public key known to all. To sign a message m ∈ G, the signer simply raises m
to the power x, such that the signed message is M = mx. Since DDH is easy in
G, anyone can verify that M is really mx, by solving DDH (g,X,m,M) (note
that m = gy for some unknown y ∈ Zq). On the other hand, forging a signature
is infeasible since it amounts to solving the Co-DHP in G.
Pairings. One way to construct GDH groups is by using pairings—efficiently
computable maps admitting two useful properties:
Definition 1 (Pairing). Let G1, G2 and GT be groups. A pairing e : G1×G2 →
GT is a bilinear non-degenerate map.
Pairings give rise to GDH groups: if e is symmetric, i.e., G1 = G2, and G1 is a
Co-DHP group, then G1 is immediately a GDH group [4]. The BLS construction
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uses a concrete symmetric pairing of a Co-DHP group over an elliptic curve. This
choice results in sufficient security as well as in relatively short representation.
A later work on pairings [12] established the fact that asymmetric pairings can
preform better in both these aspects.
Asymmetric pairings. In case G1 6= G2 the pairing is said to be either of
type-2 (if there is an efficiently computable isomorphism Ψ : G2 → G1) or of
type-3 (if there is no such Ψ). The authors of [12] define BLS-3—a variant of the
BLS scheme which utilizes type-3 pairings. This allows using groups with much
shorter representation, while maintaining sufficient security24. The essential dif-
ference between BLS and BLS-3 is the underlying hardness assumption, which
is a variant of Co-DHP, fit to the asymmetric setting:
Co-DHP*. Let G1 = 〈g1〉, G2 = 〈g2〉 be two cyclic groups of the same prime
order q. Given h, g1, g
x
1 ∈ G1 and g2, g
x
2 ∈ G2 (where x ∈ Zq), compute h
x ∈ G1.
Typically in the type-3 setting, G1 computations are easier to execute [12].
For this reason, messages in the BLS-3 scheme come from G1—so that signatures
(exponentiation of m ∈ G1) could be computed easily. Moreover, it makes sense
to have the public keys come from G2, since a public key only needs to be com-
puted once (during key generation). In the DKG however, many computations
should be made in G2.
Threshold BLS signatures. In [3], Boldyreva proposes a general method
for adapting various signatures schemes to the threshold setting. She specifically
illustrates how to use the Ped-DKG protocol to turn BLS to a threshold signature
scheme.
Appendix C Escrow-DKG over Ethereum
C.1 Ethereum background
The Ethereum blockchain, sometimes referred to as a “world computer”, is
a public blockchain in the Proof-of-Work (PoW) paradigm that maintains a
global state under consensus. Digital transactions, issued by users, are collected
in blocks which in turn are included to the blockchain periodically (through
mining). Smart contracts are arbitrary programs, deployed to the Ethereum
blockchain, and compiled to the Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM). Transac-
tions invoke smart contract execution and consume “gas” (which is a metric
system to asses the amount of “work” operations require), in order to change
the Ethereum global state.
We highlight two main Ethereum capabilities: Ethereum as an escrow service
that can follow a complex set of rules, and Ethereum as a public broadcast
channel.
24 In particular, a precompiled contract for computing a specific asymmetric pairing
was included in the Ethereum Virtual Machine, as we elaborate in App. C.
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Ethereum as escrow. A smart contract over Ethereum can easily act as an
escrow service: its state allows storing a set of users along with their balances;
and it can incorporate rules that determine when and how these balances are
released back to the users. An escrow service over Ethereum has the advantage of
that its corresponding escrow agent is completely abstract—there is no trusted
entity that controls the escrow and can be subverted. As long as the Ethereum
blockchain is viewed as a reliable system, with honest majority of hash power,
the escrow cannot diverge from its prescribed set of rules.
Evidently, a sophisticated escrow service can incentivize rational users to act
according to some predetermined notion of “correct” or desired behavior.
Communication over Ethereum. The Ethereum blockchain may serve as
a tamper-resistant, publicly-available and censorship-resistant “blackboard”.
Tamper-resistance means that once a record has been included in the blockchain
(sufficiently long ago), altering it is practically impossible. Public-availability
guarantees anyone has permission to read data from the blockchain. Finally,
censorship-resistance means that for a reasonable fee, anyone can write arbi-
trary data (of reasonable size) to the Ethereum blackboard within a reasonable
delay (that depends on the fee paid). These three qualities make Ethereum a
great broadcast communication channel. Specifically, we assume it takes at most
δ blocks to get a transaction included in a block. Additionally, by using public-
key encryption (specifically, ElGamal encryption [5]), Ethereum can be utilized
as a private communication channel.
C.2 Eth-DKG
We now turn to specify Eth-DKG—Escrow-DKG adapted to run efficiently over
the Ethereum blockchain. The modifications essentially concern two aspects:
employing specific elliptic curve groups, and minimizing on-chain resource con-
sumption by incorporating interactive proofs for complaint arbitration.
Precompiled contracts. Computing general pairings and group arithmetics
is costly, and executing many such computations over Ethereum would be in-
feasible. Fortunately, a precompiled contract that allows computing a specific
asymmetric pairing e : G1 ×G2 → GT (see [33], App. E) was incorporated into
the EVM (in the Byzantium hard fork), along with several other precompiled
contracts allowing to perform inexpensive G1 group arithmetics.
There is still another problem to circumvent in the context of group arith-
metics in Eth-DKG. Since the public key resides in G2 (see App. B), oper-
ations in Eth-DKG should be performed over G2. However, the precompiled
contracts only allow for efficient computations in G1. To tackle this limitation,
participants commit to their polynomial over both, G1 and G2, by publishing
Xui,k = g
ai,k
u (for u = 1, 2). We then rely on the following observation: we say
that two commitments X1i,k0 , X
2
i,k0
are (G1, G2)-consistent if their discrete log
values (with respect to g1 and g2) are the same. It can be shown that, as long
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as G1 and G2 are cyclic groups, X
1
i,k0
, X2i,k0 are (G1, G2)-consistent if and only
if e(g1, X
2
i,k0
) = e(X1i,k0 , g2) (see [16]).
To verify that the sub-shares match the G2 commitments, the smart contract
would first verify that the G1 commitments are consistent with the sub-shares
(using the precompiled contracts for G1 group arithmetics) and then that all
pairs X1i,k, X
2
i,k are (G1, G2)-consistent (using the precompiled contract for pair-
ing computation).
Optimistic off-chain approach. To reduce on-chain communication to min-
imum, after enrollment participants are instructed to send all public and pri-
vate data via off-chain channels. In the optimistic scenario, enrollment is the
only on-chain transaction. Pi’s enrollment transaction would contain additional
information—Digi := Digest
(
{X1i,k}, {X
2
i,k}
)
, in order to make sure that she
sends the same commitments ({X1i,k}, {X
2
i,k}
)
to all participants.
In order to retain the ability to arbitrate complaints over Ethereum, all off-
chain communication is delivered with authentication so that the smart contract
can verify the identity of the sender. This would allow using off-chain messages
as evidence when complaints are filed to the contract.
Undelivered off-chain communication. In case Pj did not receive a trans-
action from Pi off-chain, she can submit a missing data transaction. If the data
is public in nature, Pi is asked to publish it over Ethereum. If the data is pri-
vate, Pi encrypts it using Pj ’s public encryption key γ
ξj and then submits it to
the smart contract (this is the reason for including γξj in the enrollment trans-
action). If the data is too large to be written on-chain, we propose to use the
EVM memory which is much cheaper in terms of gas (but is not persistent).
This could prove that indeed, some data, in the right size (but not necessarily
the required data), was delivered. Then, if still needed, a regular complaint (that
writes only a limited amount of data on-chain, as exemplified in App. C.3 with
the interactive sub-share complaint) can be filed.
Fig. 3 gives a full description of the Eth-DKG protocol. To keep the descrip-
tion concise, we assume the reader is familiar with Escrow-DKG (see Fig. 1).
C.3 Interactive complaints over Ethereum
The arbitration of certain complaints requires complex computation that does
not scale well with t and n. In this section we demonstrate a general approach to
reduce on-chain arbitration costs via interactive protocols. Such protocols allow
to shift the “heavy-lifting” from Ethereum to the users that are in dispute.
In high level, a communication-computation trade-off is being exploited—
instead of performing an Ω(n) computation on-chain, the parties engage in an
O(log(n))-phase long interactive protocol that isolates “the core of the dispute”
and consumes O(1) on-chain resources per phase. We give a specific interac-
tive protocol for cm′3(j, i), the sub-share complaint, and compare between naive
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Fig. 3: Eth-DKG
0 Deployment. The protocol formally begins when the smart contract is de-
ployed.
1 Enrollment. The relevant Ethereum accounts enroll to the protocol by sub-
mitting enrollment transactions on-chain
tx′1(i) =
[
∆, γξi , Digi
]
This is the only transaction (excluding complaints) in Eth-DKG which is sent
on-chain.
2 Pubic commitments. Every participant Pi sends (off-chain) to all other par-
ticipants Pj her commitments transaction
tx′2(i) = [{X
1
i,k}
t
k=0, {X
2
i,k}
t
k=0]
If some Pj received tx
′
2(i) that does not match Digi she can file a com-
plaint cm′1(j, i). If some pair of commitments (X
1
i,k0
, X2i,k0) are not (G1, G2)-
consistent, Pj can file a complaint cm
′
2(j, i, k0)
a.
3 Sub-shares. Every participant Pi sends (over a private communication chan-
nel) to all other participants Pj her corresponding sub-share transaction
tx′3(i, j) = [xi,j ]
4 Sub-shares verification. Every participant Pj locally verifies the sub-shares
sent to her are consistent with the G1 commitments she received, namely
that for all i,
g
xi,j
1 =
t∏
k=0
(X1i,k)
jk
If the equality for some i′ does not hold, she can file a complaint cm′3(j, i
′).
If no complaints were filed during the course of the protocol, Eth-DKG is
said to have completed successfully (the deposits are kept for the application
stage). Note that the public key of the scheme is gx2 , and is computed by every
participant locally. If needed, anyone may publish the public key on-chain.
In case of a complaint during the course of the protocol, the smart contract
performs the arbitration and the protocol fails (it may be relaunched).
Undelivered communication. In case Pj did not receive tx
′
l(i) (for l ∈ {2, 3})
in time, she can request Pi to publish it on-chain by submitting a special alert to
the smart contract. This alert initiates a special phase of on-chain communication.
During this phase Pi is required to submit the missing transaction to the smart
contract—if the missing data is public (l = 2) she submits tx′2(i) as is; otherwise,
if it is private (l = 3), she submits tx′′3 (i, j) = [ENC(xi,j , γ
ξj )]. If Pi still fails to
submit her on-chain transaction in time, any participant Pm may file a complaint
cm′4(m, i, l) against her.
a Note that these complaints would require submitting data on-chain and might
invoke interactive arbitration, as exemplified in App. C.3.
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arbitration and the interactive arbitration in terms of gas consumption. We em-
phasize that all Ω(n) complaints can be arbitrated in the spirit of this approach.
Consider the case where participant j received from participant i the sub-
share xi,j and the commitmentsXi,k for k = 0, . . . , t (all signed by i). Participant
j then performs the following verification:
g
xi,j
1 =
t∏
k=0
(
Xi,k
)jk
(1)
In the case of failure, j submits a complaint transaction against i: cm′3(j, i).
This initiates a dispute stage between j (the “prover”) and i (the “challenger”),
where the contract takes the role of the arbitrator.
Settling the dispute naively would require j to submit to the contract both,
i’s commitments and the sub-share xi,j . Then, the contract would verify equa-
tion 1 and determine whether the complaint was just. However, this approach
consumes storage and computation linearly in t and would be unsustainable over
Ethereum. Moreover, we put special attention on elliptic curve operations [23]
which are extremely expensive—while a sustainable arbitration procedure might
consume O(log(t)) on-chain resources, it should however reduce elliptic curve
computations to minimum. We propose the interactive approach in Fig. 4 which
satisfies the above requirements (in particular, it requires only O(1) elliptic curve
computations).
Claim. Given that equation 1 does not hold and that the prover j follows her
instructions in Fig. 4, then her complaint is ruled just. Conversely, if the equa-
tion does hold and the challenger i follows her instructions in Fig. 4, then j’s
complaint is ruled unjust.
Before heading to the proof, we note that the repetitive procedure in step
2 employs a binary search between the parties to find where they first disagree
in the right-hand side computation of equation 1. By the end of step two, the
parties’ dispute is reduced to one of the following cases:
1. Case 3.(a) illustrates the scenario in which the parties agree on some ζ(l)
but disagree on ζ(l + 1) for 0 ≤ l ≤ t − 1. Then, the contract calculates
ζ(l+1) from ζ(l) and Xi,l+1 (where the latter is supplied to the contract by
j and must be signed by i). If the value ζ(l+1) that the contract calculated
conflicts with ζi(l+1) then the complaint is ruled just. Otherwise, it is ruled
unjust.
2. Case 3.(b) illustrates the scenario in which the parties disagree on ζ(0).
Then, if j supplies the contract with Xi,0, signed by i, which conflicts with
ζi(0) then the complaint is ruled just. Otherwise, it is ruled unjust.
3. Case 3.(c) illustrates the scenario in which the parties agree on ζ(t). Then, if
j supplies the contract with xi,j , signed by i, where g
xi,j
1 conflicts with ζ
i(t)
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Fig. 4: Interactive sub-share complaint
Let j be the prover and i be the challenger.
(a) As a preparatory step each of the parties computes locally:
ζ(m) =
m∏
k=0
(
Xi,k
)jk
for m = 0, . . . , t
We denote by ζi(∗) and ζj(∗) the values i and j compute respectively.
(b) The dispute phase progresses in rounds, where in each round, i and j interact
by submitting transactions to the contract in turnsa. The contract’s state is
initialized: l← −1, h← t+ 1.
While h− l > 1 execute the following round:
(a) Each of the parties locally compute m = l +
⌈
h−l
2
⌉
.
(b) i submits to the contract ζi(m). The contract updates: last ←
ζi(m).
(c) j submits to the contract the bit β where:
β =
{
‘agree‘ if ζi(m) = ζj(m)
‘disagree‘ otherwise
If β = ‘agree‘, the contract updates: highestagree ← last, l← m.
Otherwise, the contract updates: lowestdisagree ← last, h← m.
(c) Once the stopping condition is met, h = l + 1, and there are three possible
cases:
i. If l > −1 and h < t + 1, j submits to the contract Xi,l+1, signed by i.
The contract verifies:
highestagree · (Xi,l+1)
jl+1 = lowestdisagree
ii. If l = −1, j submits to the contract Xi,0, signed by i. The contract
verifies:
lowestdisagree = Xi,0
iii. If h = t + 1, j submits to the contract xi,j , signed by i. The contract
verifies:
highestagree = g
xi,j
1
For each of the above cases, if the equality holds the complaint is ruled
unjust, otherwise it is ruled just.
a If one of them, in her turn, fails to submit a valid transaction within a prede-
termined time (block height), she forfeits the dispute and loses her deposit.
Proof. First assume equation 1 does hold but j complains. We show that the
complaint is ruled unjust. During step 2, j must admit one of the following
strategies:
1. If j at some point agrees and at another point disagrees, then we are in
case 3.(a), and from the assumption that i follows her instructions correctly,
ζi(l) =
∏l
k=0
(
Xi,k
)jk
, j must supply the contract with Xi,l+1 (from the
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assumption that equation 1 holds). Indeed, since ζi(l + 1) =
∏l+1
k=0
(
Xi,k
)jk
the contract would compute ζ(l+1) = ζi(l+1) and rule that the complaint
is unjust.
2. If j always disagrees, then we are in case 3.(b) and from the assumption that
i follows her instructions correctly, ζi(0) = Xi,0. j must supply the contract
with Xi,0 (from the assumption that equation 1 holds). Indeed, since ζ
i(0)
does not conflict with Xi,0 the contract rules that the complaint is unjust.
3. If j always agrees, then we are in case 3.(c) and from the assumption that i
follows her instructions correctly and that equation 1 holds, ζi(t) = g
xi,j
1 . j
must supply the contract with xi,j and the contract computes g
xi,j
1 . Indeed,
since ζi(t) does not conflict with g
xi,j
1 the contract rules the complaint unjust.
In the other direction, we show that if equation 1 does not hold and j com-
plains, then the complaint is ruled just. During step 2, i must admit one of the
following strategies:
1. If i always submits ζ(m) then j will always agree and step 2 ends in case
3.(c). From the assumption that the equation 1 does not hold, once j submits
xi,j and the contract computes g
xi,j
1 , it finds a mismatch with ζ(t) and rules
that the complaint is just.
2. If i at some point submits ζi(m) 6= ζ(m) then step 2 ends in case 3.(a)
or 3.(b). If i always submits ζi(m) 6= ζ(m) then eventually, she submits
ζi(0) 6= Xi,0. When j submits Xi,0 the contract rules the complaint as just.
Otherwise, If i submits some ζi(m) = ζ(m) then the interactive protocol
would find some 0 ≤ m∗ ≤ t−1 such that ζi(m∗) = ζ(m∗) and ζi(m∗+1) 6=
ζ(m∗+1). When j submits Xi,m∗+1 the contract rules the complaint as just.
⊓⊔
We turn to analyze the computational complexity of the interactive dispute
protocol. As mentioned before, the repetitive procedure in step 2 performs a
binary search over t+1 values thus the dispute takes O(log(t)) rounds. At every
round each of the parties submits to the contract a constant amount of data
and the contract performs a constant amount of computations. Together with
the final step, where constant computations are performed, we conclude that
the overall complexity of the dispute phase is O(log(t)) in time and space. We
further emphasize that elliptic curve computations occur only in step 3, hence
our protocol requires only O(1) such computations in total.
In Fig. 5 we show the actual gas costs of the two approaches to arbitrate the
sub-share complaint—the interactive approach and the naive on-chain approach.
The results are taken from a prototype implementation of the two arbitration
procedures.
We note that currently25 Ethereum’s block gas limit is approximately 8M
gas. Hence the naive approach would be practically infeasible to run in a smart
contract for any threshold values that are greater than t = 150. In contrast, the
interactive approach can handle very high threshold values, e.g., for t = 100, 000
the gas cost for each of the parties is much lower than 1M gas.
25 As for September 2018.
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Fig. 5: Sub-share complaint arbitration gas costs. Two approaches are presented:
a single round (naive) arbitration; an interactive multi-round arbitration.
Appendix D Incentive driven multi-round leader election
In Bitcoin, miners invest money in mining hardware, electricity and maintenance
in order to participate in an ongoing PoW lottery. When elected, miners have the
right to mint new bitcoins. While the mining game has proved to attract many
miners, it suffers two main problems. First, it was shown that miners, following
selfish mining and block withholding strategies [13,29], could bias the lottery to
their benefit, if they control enough of the hash power. This incentivizes miners
to collude and form large mining pools. In a situation where 51% of the mining
power is in the hands of colluding miners, they can ensure 100% of the rewards
to themselves. The second problem is that mining is not a ”fair” game. Ideally,
a miner’s probability of winning the lottery would be proportional to the money
they invested. With variations in mining hardware, electricity costs and software
advancements like AsicBoost [21], the mining landscape in Bitcoin is far from
ideal.
We propose a multi-round leader election protocol, in which the leader in
round r is elected according to a secret value Sr, which is kept hidden until round
r and is revealed only at the beginning of the round. Similarly to our lottery
example, Sr is the unique threshold signature of Sr−1. The leader is elected
among a set of candidates, which are also the ones producing the signature.
At the start of the protocol they all engage in Escrow-DKG to generate the
appropriate keys (recall that in Escrow-DKG participants are required to make
a deposit to the escrow).
Similarly to Bitcoin, by publishing Sr the elected leader is entitled to mint ρ
new coins, where in our model notations, R = ρ · e, and e is the total number of
rounds in the protocol. Once e rounds have passed, Escrow-DKG is relaunched
with a fresh set of participants, and possibly larger deposits. This implies that
Escrow-DKGwould be run over Ethereum periodically, say every week or month.
It is crucial for Escrow-DKG to support a very large number of participants, n
Rational Threshold Cryptosystems 29
(so that it is unfeasible for one entity to control too many DKG participants).
The Srs would be included in Ethereum blocks according to some predetermined
schedule (say every 40th block). Once a new Sr has been published, the elected
leader would propose a sidechain block, hash-referencing the Ethereum block
that contains Sr. Obviously, the leader would also hash-chain the previous block
in the sidechain.
While chain splits are definitely possible, at this point we will not elaborate
as to how they might be resolved. We will say that chain splits can be addressed
by following the longest chain rule, or other chain selection rules dictated by
Byzantine agreement protocols (e.g., PBFT [11], Tendermint [6], Casper FFG [9],
or Hot-stuff [1]). We shall also say that in order to incentivize participants to
follow the chain selection rule, its logic should be enforced by the Ethereum
smart contract that serves as escrow26.
Chain rules aside, t+ 1 colluding parties would be able to reveal the Srs in
advance and could translate this information to disproportionate rewards. This
is also true in Bitcoin as mentioned earlier. There are a few advantages to our
approach though. First, t can be tuned. Specifically, t could be larger than n/2
resulting in better security. Of course, the threshold parameter must coincide
with the chain selection rule and tuning it to be too large puts the robustness
of the sidechain in risk (this trade-off has been discussed in Sec. 5). Second,
framing, which is actualized by submitting Sr prior to its prescribed Ethereum
height, makes the system trustworthy as long as no entity is controlling t+12
DKG participants. This would be a realistic assumption if anyone that wished
to do so could enrol to Escrow-DKG, and the total deposit, ∆ ·n, would be high
enough (relative to R).
Unlike in Bitcoin, in our proposal, the probability of each DKG participant to
be elected leader is equal. The only way to increase one’s probability, and thus
also her fraction of rewards, is to buy more DKG participants. Our protocol
induces a fair lottery—with a linear relationship between the sum invested and
the expectancy of rewards. Moreover, breaking this linear relationship comes
with a known and clear price tag27.
This scheme relies on a super-scalable DKG and the need to reconstruct
threshold signatures with very large ts—this would be computationally inten-
sive and would require significant communication among the participants. One
approach to circumvent this problem could borrow from Dfinity [22]—use many
parallel independent DKG protocols run side by side. Another approach, pre-
sented in [10], generalizes on the traditional SSS-based DKG approach with
independent linear equations dictated by a matrix. Using adequate sparse ma-
trices yields in highly a scalable DKG procedure (in which reconstruction has a
negligible probability of failing, even if enough participants try to reconstruct).
26 Long-range attacks could be addressed by the “social consensus” approach [8].
27 Without elaborating, the option to frame hidden chains could largely mitigate the
risk of long-range attacks.
